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Abstract 
China is experiencing rapid urbanization with the steady emergence of large cities, 
leading to policy discussions of the role of large cities in its development. While the 
consensus is that agglomeration plays an important role in economic development and 
large cities can act as engines of economic growth, there is relatively little empirical 
knowledge of the effects of agglomeration on inequality. In this study, we apply panel 
data from a micro firm-level survey and from city-level data to investigate whether 
there is a causal relationship between agglomeration and establishment wage 
dispersion in China. Given potential endogeneity of city size, we employ an 
instrumental variable regression (IV) approach. We find strong evidence that 
agglomeration has significant effects on wage dispersion in the short- and long-run. 
The link between agglomeration and wage dispersion is heterogeneous across regions. 
The spatially varying results appear to be due to different stages of development. Our 
results are consistent with two-sided sorting models in that it appears that the most 
productive and least productive firms are moving from inland cities to the coast. 
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1. Introduction 
China is experiencing rapid urbanization with the urban population share rising above 
50% in 2011, representing the first time when more than half of its population resided 
in cities. Increasing numbers of large cities are emerging even as the central 
government has tried to control their size. There are already 15 cities which have a 
population larger than 10 million (OECD, 2015).1 It is estimated that more large 
Chinese cities will develop during the 13th-Five Year Plan that runs from 2016 to 
2020.  
 Cities can play an important role in economic development and can act as an 
engine of economic growth (Puga, 2010; Chen and Partridge, 2013; Duranton, 2015; 
Collier and Venables, 2017). Productivity typically rises with city size due to 
agglomeration effects, giving them an advantage over rural areas. Especially large 
cities can produce positive spillover effects by providing job opportunities for rural 
commuters and creating new opportunities for firms to locate in nearby small cities 
and rural areas (Ali et al., 2011; Duvier, 2013; Kerr and Kominers, 2015; Zheng et al., 
2015; Frick and Rodriguez-Pose, 2016). However, these positive factors can be offset 
by congestion effects that limit commuting and other opportunities (Saito and Wu, 
2016; Zhang and Kockelman, 2016). 
 There is a large literature that examines the effects of city size on productivity 
and wage premium. From this literature, some have stressed that urbanization has 
negative effects including the possibility that it widens income inequality. There are 
two ways that this may occur: through how city size affects between city urban wage 
premium or between city income distribution; through how city size affects within city 
wage premium or within city income distribution. 
On the between city wage premium or between city income distribution, Combes 
et al. (2008) show that larger agglomeration economies are associated with the sorting 
of high-skilled workers to earn higher returns. Agglomeration economies also suggest 
that firm productivity is positively related to city size (Combes et al. 2012). Higher 
                                                             
1 They include Shanghai, Guangzhou, Beijing, Shenzhen, Wuhan, Chengdu, Chongqing, Tianjin, Hangzhou, Xi’an, 
Changzhou, Shantou, Nanjing, Jinan, Harbin (OECD, 2015).  
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urban productivity and the associated increase in wages provide incentives for 
rural-urban migration. Tougher selection increases the returns to skills and enlarges 
urban income inequality (Behrens and Robert-Nicoud, 2014; Behrens et al., 2014). 
Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012) show that differences in returns to experience between 
large and small cities contribute to the observed wage inequality. Chauvin et al. (2017) 
find that there is strong evidence of agglomeration economies that affect earnings in 
developing countries including China, India, and Brazil. 
 On the within city wage premium or within city income distribution, most of the 
literature focuses on individual earnings across different city sizes. For instance, 
Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013) find a strong positive relationship between U.S. 
within-city wage inequality and city size. The notion that large cities only lead to 
positive sorting of the most productive firms or workers appears to be somewhat of an 
oversimplification. Large cities appear to attract both high- and low-skilled workers 
(Eeckhout et al. 2014; Accetturo et al., 2014). Florida et al. (2012) find that skills 
have a significant effect on city wages. D'Costa and Overman (2014) demonstrate that 
there is an urban premium for wage levels in Britain and work experience in cities has 
a positive effect over time on wage growth. Combes et al. (2015) also find that 
migration and agglomeration have stronger effects on wage gains for skilled natives 
than for the unskilled in China. Likewise, Pan et al. (2016) show that the city size–
wage premium varies with difference in skills among urban residents in China. 
 There is also evidence that high-productivity firms and low-productivity firms 
coexist in cities (Forslid and Okubo, 2014, 2015). In this case, large cities may have 
wider wage disparities since there is more variation between the productivity of firms 
as well as in worker skills. Somewhat consistent with this pattern, Combes et al. 
(2012) show that agglomeration rather than firm selection is the main factor driving 
spatial productivity differences in France. Faberman and Freedman (2016) find that 
the returns to agglomeration diffuse within a city through firm’s reallocation rather 
than through an increase in existing-firm productivity. However, the within-city firm 
wage distribution is much less explored in the literature. We will try to help fill this 
gap by examining the dispersion of firm-level wage in Chinese cities. 
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 China is an interesting case to test the link between city size and cross-firm wage 
disparities. It is experiencing rapid urbanization and there are large variation in city 
size. There are large numbers of “big” cites as well as “small” cities to better identify 
causal effects. Furthermore, there are large income gaps between the coastal and 
inland regions with the coastal region being much wealthier. Much of these income 
disparities relate to regional differences in firm productivity and the associated 
differences in the regional distribution of firms. They date back to the origins of 
market reforms, and it seems reasonable to assume that coastal cities are more 
representative of flexible competitive labor markets than in the less-developed inland. 
Thus, we also can test whether the effects of city size on firm wage distribution 
depends on the stage of development.  
Related to these firm productivity and wage differences are serious concerns 
regarding income inequality. The Gini coefficient was 0.465 in 2016 according to the 
China National Bureau of Statistics, which is similar to the corresponding estimate for 
the United States as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. Some research even reports 
a higher Chinese Gini coefficient of 0.61 in 2011 (Xie and Zhou, 2014). Therefore, it 
is urgent to know whether the continuing rapid growth of large cities will further 
increase income inequality, which would inform current policy discussions about the 
optimal city-size distribution.  
  In this study, we begin by describing our theoretical framework based on NEG 
models that include “footloose-capital” with firm heterogeneity of productivity to 
motivate the empirical work. Most notably, the theory predicts that there exist both 
high- and low-productivity firms in large cities and there is a corresponding structural 
relationship between city size and within-city firm wage dispersion. We then apply 
panel data from a micro firm-level survey and from city-level data to investigate 
whether there is a causal relationship between Chinese city size and establishment 
wage dispersion. Given the possible endogeneity of city size, we use a 
regression-based approach to construct an IV. This kind of IV is novel in that it is akin 
to the industry mix variable commonly used in the literature but allows industries to 
have different multiplier effects.  
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We not only examine the short-run linkages between city size and wage 
dispersion but also assess their long-run relationship. We believe short-run 
movements mostly represent shifts in labor demand and supply. However, in the 
long-run, we expect agglomeration effects to dominate. We argue that some of the 
differences in the literature may reflect this distinction. Given that firm and household 
adjustments to labor market shocks may differ across regions and among sectors, we 
explore the effects of city size on wage dispersion between the coastal and inland 
regions to investigate if the level of development forges agglomeration links. 
Likewise, we assess this relationship for different ownership structures within these 
two regions and whether the development story is driven by small cities that dominate 
the sample. Then we consider whether the results are primarily between industry or do 
they apply to within industry as well. We also explore whether it is high-wage or 
low-wage workers who benefits from agglomeration.  
 A brief summary of our results is as follows. There is strong evidence that 
agglomeration has significant effects on wage dispersion. The relationship between 
city size and wage dispersion is heterogeneous across regions. In the case of coastal 
cities, the population coefficient is insignificant in the short run and positive and 
significant in the long run, consistent with agglomeration increasing wage disparities; 
in the inland cities, city size has significantly positive effects on wage dispersion in 
the short run and negative effects in the long run, being driven mainly by smaller 
response to labor demand shock. The differing coastal/inland region results are not 
due to varying private/public ownership distributions or small cities dominating the 
sample. Rather, these differences appear to be due to differing stages of development. 
The results are consistent with two-sided sorting models in that the most productive 
and least productive firms are moving from inland cities to the coast—reducing inland 
wage disparities across firms and increasing them in coastal cities in the long run. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe our 
conceptual framework. Section 3 presents the empirical model and estimation 
implementation. Section 4 describes the data and section 5 presents the estimation 
results. The last section concludes. 
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2. Conceptual Framework 
This section uses a simplified version of the Forslid and Okubo (2014, 2015) 
“footloose capital” NEG model to describe our conceptual framework relating city 
size to firm wage dispersion. These models illustrate how agglomeration affects 
capital movement, though they do not capture labor mobility across cities, meaning 
that in our context, we are illustrating equilibrium effects with no further labor 
mobility.2 The key feature of these models is their incorporation of firm heterogeneity 
in labor productivity. It is assumed that higher productivity is associated with higher 
capital intensity.  
Consumer Behavior 
There are two cities with asymmetric population (or city size). One is a large city 
and another one is a small city (denoted by * below). There are two types of 
production factors, capital and labor. The large-city share of factors is s (assumed to 
be greater than 0.5) and the small city’s share is 1-s. It is assumed that capital is 
mobile between cities but capital owners are not. Labor is mobile across sectors but 
not across cities. Cities differ in size, but their capital-labor ratios are identical. Each 
city has two sectors: agriculture and manufacturing. The agriculture sector is perfectly 
competitive and produces a single homogeneous good (A) using a constant returns to 
scale technology that only uses labor. The manufacturing sector is monopolistically 
competitive and produces a variety of differentiated goods (M) using an increasing 
returns to scale technology that employs both labor and capital.3  
 Individuals derive utility from consumption of both the agriculture good and the 
differentiated manufacturing good. 
 
1
M AU C C
  ,  0 1                                           (1) 
where  is the constant, CA is consumption of the homogenous good. CM is a 
consumption index of the differentiated manufacturing goods: 
                                                             
2 Their models assume that wages are the same between firms but we show what happens to wage dispersion 
when the assumption is relaxed.  
3 The sector labels should not be interpreted literally. Agriculture refers to an industry that operates in perfect 
competition whereas manufacturing reflects a monopolistic competitive industry.  
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where kc is the consumed amount of variety k,  is the elasticity of substitution, and
 is the number of varieties available. City subscripts are suppressed for ease of 
notation.  
 Each consumer spends a share  of his income on manufacturing goods. Utility 
maximization gives the demand function for a domestically produced variety i: 
 
1
i
i
k
k
p Y
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p dk


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



                                                 (3) 
where kp is price of variety k and Y is income in the city.  
 Capital ownership is assumed to be fully inter-regionally diversified, making 
income of each city constant and independent of the location of capital. It is assumed 
that total expenditure (E) equals total factor income. Thus,  
/E wL E                                                   (4) 
Without loss of generality, units are chosen so 1L   and wage is assumed to equal 1 
(see the explanation below). The income of city j is equal to its share of total 
expenditure given by  
 j j jY s E s

 
 

                                              (5) 
Producer Behavior 
Each unit of agriculture production requires one unit of labor. The homogenous 
good is freely traded (zero transportation costs) and it is the numeraire by assumption:  
 1AP w                                                        (6) 
where w is the uniform wage rate.  
 The manufactured goods use both capital and labor in production. Firms are 
differentiated and have a firm-specific marginal production cost i , which is 
distributed with a cumulative distribution function ( )iF  . There is a fixed amount of 
national capital endowment, implying the national number of firms (N) is constant. 
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Without loss of generality, N is normalized to 1. Following Forslid and Okubo (2014), 
it is assumed that firms with a lower i  have a higher capital requirement. 
Specifically, it is assumed that the capital requirement for a firm is given by 
 ( ) 2i ih
   ,  0                                             (7) 
where  is a parameter. Note that ( )ih  is a decreasing concave function. Firm 
heterogeneity in the model is simply expressed by differing ( )ih  . The total cost (TC) 
for firm i is: 
 i( )i i i iTC h x                                                  (8) 
where   is the return to capital (or cost of capital), 
i( ) ih    is the fixed cost, and 
i ix is the variable cost. 
Shipping the manufactured goods between cities incurs an “iceberg” 
transportation cost. For one unit of good traded between cities, ij >1 units must be 
shipped. The trade costs are symmetric between cities so that ij ji    . Profit 
maximization by manufacturing firms gives a constant mark-up over the marginal 
cost: 
 
1
i ip





                                                   (9) 
and the export price is ip . 
Equilibrium 
The return to capital for a firm in the large city is the firm’s operation profit 
divided by its capital stock.  
 
1
*
(1 )
( )
( )( )
i
i
i
s s
h
 
  
  
  
  
   
                              (10) 
where
1    , ranging between 0 and 1, represents “freeness” of trade between cities 
(0 is autarky and 1 is zero trade cost). The right hand side is derived from equations (3) 
and (5), and  
 
1 1
1 1
0 0
( ) (1 ) ( )i is dF s dF
                                        (11) 
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( ) (1 ) ( )i is dF s dF
                                       (12) 
Labor stock is assumed to be sufficiently large so that the homogeneous sector pins 
down the wage and is active in all cities.  
 Forslid and Okubo (2014) show that there exists both high-productivity and 
low-productivity firms in large cities since the effects of i on the return to capital 
depends on the ratio of 
1
i
  to ( )ih  . Given that ( )ih  is concave and 
1
i
  is 
convex, under certain conditions it will be the case that the return to capital is highest 
for firms with a low and a high
i . A firm will move from a small city to a large city 
when:  
 
1
*
*
(1 )
( ) ( ) (1 ) 0
(2 )( )
i
i i
i
s s



       
  
  
       
    
         (13) 
where  is firm moving costs. The function is U-shaped in 
i  under the condition 
that 1   . Thus, firms at both ends of the productivity distribution will tend to 
move to large cities since the gains from moving are higher than the moving cost 
while firms in the middle of the productivity distribution will tend to locate in small 
cities since the gains from moving are less than moving costs.  
 This framework establishes a structural relationship between city size and the 
productivity dispersion across the city’s firms. Given that a firm’s wage is determined 
by its productivity, we expect a corresponding structural relationship between city size 
and within-city firm wage dispersion. Empirically, we will specify the following 
model: 
 ( )WageDis f CitySize,X                                         （14） 
where the dependent variable is firm wage variation across different firms within a 
city, CitySize is the city size and X contains the control variables.  
 
3. Estimation Implementation 
This section describes our empirical model. We begin by showing how the short-run 
and long-run relationships between city size and firm wage dispersion are estimated 
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followed by a discussion of the instruments we use to address potential endogeneity in 
the model. Our base model described below examines aggregate city-level wage 
dispersion as the dependent variable. In sensitivity analysis when we describe the 
empirical results, we report models that instead use within-industry wage dispersion 
(for each industry) at the city level as the dependent variable. 
 
(1) Model specification  
The dependent variable (WageDis) is the cross-firm wage dispersion within city 
measured as the standard deviation of log wage across manufacturing firms. 
Specifically, we specify wage dispersion in city i in year t as: 
, 1 , 1 , ,i t i t i t i t i tWageDis CitySize Control a                            (15)               
where CitySize is our key explanatory variable defined as log population. 
ia and t are 
city and time (year) fixed effects respectively. The city fixed effects account for 
time-invariant omitted factors in each city that might be correlated with the 
explanatory variables and year fixed effects account for common national effects such 
as the business cycle.  
The theoretical model suggests we should use firm productivity. However, we 
believe any productivity estimate that we could derive would be so noisy that it would 
be nearly useless, but we have confidence in the firm’s estimate of wage and wage is 
often used as a proxy of productivity. Therefore, we use wage to derive the dependent 
variable.  
 We include four types of control variables. The first type includes log GDP per 
capita (GDP-Per-Capita) and the ratio of university graduates to population 
(Average-Education). We use the former to control for city productivity and the latter 
to control for the average education level. The second type contains industrial and 
ownership composition at the city level. We use the share of employment in the 
secondary industry (IND2, including manufacturing and construction) to measure 
industrial structure. While China’s economy has been liberalizing for decades, there is 
still a significant share of state manufacturers (especially in the early years of the 
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survey). Likewise, among private-sector firms, there is a key distinction between 
foreign-controlled firms and firms controlled by Chinese ownership. Thus, we use 
two variables to capture the ownership structure of manufacturing in which the first is: 
(1) Public-Share: the share of manufacturing employment of state-own enterprises 
(SOE) plus collective ownership enterprises (COE). We define a firm as SOE or COE 
if the state or collective ownership share is over 50%; (2) Foreign-Share: the share of 
manufacturing employment accounted for by foreign firms. A foreign firm is defined 
as a firm in which foreign shareholders have a majority ownership. The omitted share 
is the domestic private ownership share in each city. 
 We also include two sets of variable grouping to capture the characteristics of 
manufacturing firms. First, we use the mean of log-firm employment and the standard 
deviation of log employment (lnL-mean and lnL-SD). While these are primarily 
control variables, we expect their first-order effects to reflect that larger firms tend to 
pay higher wages, and thus a greater standard deviation of firm size should increase 
wage dispersion. The second is the mean of the log-firm capital-labor ratio and its 
standard deviation (lnK/L-mean and lnK/L-SD). We expect that the capital/labor ratio 
is positively linked to higher average human capital at the firm (increasing the 
average wage) and a higher capital/labor ratio implies a higher marginal product of 
labor, again suggesting a higher average wage. Thus, the standard deviation of the 
capital/labor ratio will reflect technological and human capital differences across 
manufactures that could cause wage dispersion.  
 The fourth grouping of control variables accounts for the inter-sector disparity 
because a wide variation in the average wage across sectors would mechanically 
increase overall wage dispersion in the city. Thus, we use the standard deviation of 
log wage between manufacturing sectors (lnWage-ind-SD). Specifically, 
manufacturing firms are grouped into 30 sectors according to their two-digit industry 
codes and we compute the average wage within each sector and the corresponding 
standard deviation of wage between sectors.  
 When estimating equation (15) using the standard fixed effects panel model, 
annual within-city movements of the explanatory variables are what identify the 
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model. In terms of the city log population variable, annual within changes mainly 
represent some combination of labor-supply and demand shocks because annual 
movements around the mean are too short to identify the longer-run trend of 
agglomeration growth that would be less affected by random shocks. In other words, 
the random annual movements are dominated by the long-run cross-sectional effects, 
meaning that almost all of the city-size effects we are trying to capture is in the fixed 
effect. Thus, agglomeration economies are driven by the average population, while 
random variations around that mean have more transitory effects.  
 Because the panel model represented in equation (15) is inadequate to identify the 
long-run effects when the variation is mostly cross-sectional, we instead assess those 
long-run effects behind agglomeration by applying a two-step method. In the first step, 
we simply estimate the panel model shown in equation (15). Then in the second step, 
we use the estimated city fixed effects as the dependent variable and in a subsequent 
model, regress it on the average characteristics over the sample period (very similar 
but not exactly a between regression, because we use the fixed effect as the dependent 
variable). We instrument for population as in the first stage in the manner described 
below. This model is represented as equation (16): 
2 2 i ii ia CitySize Control                                          (16) 
in which the dependent variable is the estimated city fixed effects from equation (15). 
The explanatory variables are mostly the same (as described above) but averaged over 
the sample period. Thus, this should provide the long-run response of city wage 
dispersion with respect to city size as it captures long-run cross-sectional effects. 
Therefore, we respectively interpret β1 in equation (15) and β2 in equation (16) as 
short-run and long-run effects of city size on wage dispersion respectively.  
 
(2) Identification and Instrumental Variable Implementation  
One concern with the estimation of models above is that there could be endogeneity. 
On one hand, wage dispersion could affect city size, most likely via migration and 
sorting. Moreover, wage dispersion and city size could be affected by omitted 
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variables, creating potential endogeneity. To assess this concern, we construct the 
following instrumental variable (IV).  
 One possible instrument is the “Bartik” (1991) instrument from shift-share 
analysis, which has long become the workhorse instrument to identify regional labor 
demand shocks: 
*C CS NS
S
IndMix EmpShare EmpGrow                              (17) 
where IndMixC is the industry mix growth rate for city C between initial period and 
time T. S depicts the industry (sector). EmpShareCS is the employment share of sector 
S in city C in initial period. EmpGrowNS is the national employment growth rate of 
sector S between periods 0 and T. The instrument is simply the growth rate in the 
city’s employment if all of its industries grew at the national growth rate. This 
instrument is valid if there are no offsetting labor supply responses correlated with 
lagged industry structure (conditional on controlling for city fixed effects and other 
variables that would capture supply responses).  
 There are two possible weaknesses of the Bartik instrument. One is that it 
constrains growth rates for all industries in each city to equal their respective national 
growth rates rather than the actual pattern that some industries have larger (smaller) 
effects from having larger (smaller) multiplier effects than others, which reduces the 
strength of the instrument in the first stage. Second, the Bartik instrument is 
particularly ineffective when the national trends are relatively weak compared to 
idiosyncratic city-based shocks, again producing a statistically weak instrument in the 
first stage. Indeed, we feared this could be problem for China in particular as regional 
growth patterns have greatly diverged, especially between the coast and inland 
regions. Thus, it was not too surprising that when we tried the Bartik instrument, we 
found that it was very weak in the first stage, with F-statistics well below the 10 rule 
of thumb (in fact, the F-statistics were typically below 2).  
 To address this weakness in the Bartik instrument, we use an alternative that is 
akin to the industry mix variable, but allows each industry to have differing multiplier 
effects. Following Detang-Dessendre et al. (2016) and their use of IV_ REGRESS, we 
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first regress the population growth between initial period in 1990 and subsequent time 
T on the 1990 employment shares of 42 industries (and control variables X including 
provincial fixed effects) in city C:  
1990 0 1 1 2 2 42 42 +C T C C C C CPopGrow Sh Sh Sh X e                (18) 
And then use the predicted population growth rate from equation (18) and the 
population in initial period to compute the population in time T:  
1990 1990(1 )CT C TPop PopGrow Pop        (T= 1999-2007)         (19) 
in which equation (19) becomes our IV_REGRESS instrument for population. We use 
the initial employment share in 42 sectors in 1990, which is the earliest available 
detailed data on industry structure. One advantage of the IV_REGRESS instrument is 
that because it is based on OLS using the initial city industry shares, it should be 
BLUE in a statistical sense and outperform the linear Bartik instrument that is also 
based on initial industry shares (but with the restriction about national growth rates). 
Further, we use deeper lags of industry structure to avoid endogeneity as 1990 
predates our sample period by several years.  
 
4. Data  
The data used in this study are from three sources: (1) China Industrial Firm Survey 
Data. (2) China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy. (3) China Population 
Census Data. The firm micro data that form the basis of the analysis are from 
firm-level survey over the 1999 to 2007 period, which reflect data availability.4 The 
survey was conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics. It covers all 
manufacturing firms which have annual revenues larger than 5 million yuan.5 Though 
this eliminates some very small manufacturers, the survey represents the vast majority 
of them (and nearly all of national manufacturing output). We use the survey data to 
compute wage disparities, share of employment in public and foreign firms, and 
                                                             
4 See detailed discussion on the survey in Brandt et al. (2014). 
5 The survey also covers firms in other sectors such as mining and utilities. We focus on the manufacturing sector, 
which is the main body of the survey.   
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average manufacturing characteristics in each city. We measure wage by total wage 
bill and employment benefits divided by the total number of employees in each firm.  
 We use population, GDP, number of university graduates, and employment by 
industry from the China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy (NBS, various 
issues) to compute city size, productivity, average education and industry composition. 
Given that the population data in the sample are Hukou population, which is not 
identical to resident population, we adjust population with an interpolation method. 
Specifically, we use resident population in 2000 and 2010 from the population census 
to compute the ratio of residents to Hukou in these two years and then construct the 
ratio for other years with interpolation and derive the resident population in these 
years. We apply the adjusted population in this way to measure city size. However, 
given that there are measurement errors by using growth of adjusted population, we 
use growth of Hukou population when constructing the IV. 6  We also use the 
population census data in 1990 to compute the employment share of 42 sectors in 
each city for the instrument construction.  
 Chinese cities can be divided into four types based on administrative hierarchy. 
They are city province, provincial capital cities, prefecture cities, and county-level 
cities. We include all cities except county-level cities in our sample of “cities”. We 
drop county cities since many county-level cities have few manufacturing firms with 
annual revenue over 5 million yuan. Cities we study cover “total cities” as defined by 
NBS since many manufacturing firms are not located in the functional area (district 
under cities) but in the suburb. Given that boundaries in some cities have changed in 
the sample period, we use the definition of cities in 2007 to adjust these cities so that 
the definition of cities is consistent in the sample period. We have 336 
prefecture-level and above regions including 283 prefecture-level cities (Di Ji Shi), 4 
city provinces (Zhi Xia Shi), 17 prefectures(Di Qu) , 32 autonomous prefectures (Zi 
                                                             
6 Nevertheless, we use growth of adjusted population to construct the IV and find that the results do not 
significantly change though the standard errors are larger as expected. 
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Zhi Zhou) and league (Meng) in our sample.7 We use the convention of referring to 
them as cities to ease exposition.  
 
Table 1 near here 
 
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for cities and wage dispersion related to our 
sample. There is large wage dispersion among firms and the distribution of wages 
varies dramatically across cities. The maximum value of the standard deviation of log 
wage is almost 40 times of the minimum value. The average of log population in 
cities is about 5.6, which converts to 3.8 million people. On average, log GDP per 
capita is 9.2 (which convert to 12,000 Yuan in 1999 price). Less than a quarter of 
employment is in the secondary industry. More than 50 percent of employment is in 
state-owned or collective-owned enterprises and about 10 percent is in foreign 
enterprises. The average of log employment in firms is about 6.5 (which converts to 
1,039 employees) and the average capital/labor ratio is around 4.9. The wage 
inequality between sectors is substantial. The standard deviation of log wage between 
sectors is about half of that among all firms, indicating that industrial composition 
plays a key role in affecting city-level firm wage dispersion.  
 
Figure 1 near here 
 
Figure 1 plots the standard deviation of log wage against city population in all 
cities in the sample period. As is apparent from the graph, wage dispersion increases 
with city size with a slope of 0.03 at 1% significance level. This is somewhat 
consistent with the prediction of our theoretical framework. 
 
5. Results 
(1) Base Estimation Results 
The base fixed-effect IV estimation results for the entire sample are reported in Table 
                                                             
7 We re-estimate the models by only including the 283 prefecture-level cities and find that the results are robust.  
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2.8 The models are reported in stages as the four groupings of control variables are 
added and removed from the model to illustrate robustness. At the bottom of the table, 
we report joint F-statistic p-values for each of the four variables groupings: city 
productivity & education; industry & ownership variables; firm characteristic 
variables; and the inter-sectoral standard deviation of wages. The Hausman 
endogeneity test and Wid-statistics in the first stage regression are also reported in the 
bottom rows in the table. The Hausman test strongly suggests that city size is 
endogenous, whereas that the IV_REGRESS is a strong instrument in the first-stage.  
 The joint F-statistic p-values indicate that the four control variable groupings are 
always statistically significant, except for one case of the industry-structure group in 
column (3). Since, the individual coefficients are not always statistically significant, 
this suggests that there is some multicollinearity in the four groupings.  
 Regarding our main variable of interest, population has a positive and statistically 
significant association with wage dispersion at the 1 percent level in all the 
estimations. The population variable is robust across a wide range of specifications. 
Even after controlling for city productivity, average education, industrial and 
ownership structure, firm characteristics and inter-sector disparities, increasing city 
size is associated with greater inequality in manufacturing wages. Indeed, the only 
case in which the population coefficient is tangibly affected is when its magnitude is 
reduced in column (6) when the (between) inter-sectoral wage variation variable is 
included—i.e., some of the positive city-size/dispersion association is related to 
inter-sectoral wage variation. Thus, even after controlling for inter-sectoral wage 
dispersion, short-run shifts in population are still positively related to wage 
dispersion. 
 Overall, this short-run finding is consistent with positive short-run agglomeration 
effects in that both low-wage and high-wage firms sort to larger cities, increasing 
wage dispersion. Yet, an alternative explanation that we prefer is that short-term 
shocks around the mean (controlling for year fixed effects) increase wage dispersion 
                                                             
8 We rerun the estimations with OLS and find that the main results do not significantly change though the 
coefficients of the city size variable are smaller. 
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as many firms increase wages (others may decrease wages) due to labor demand 
shocks (which is the exogenous shock in the instrument). 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 near here  
 
 Annual movements of population around the mean are not the best way to assess 
long-run effects that likely drive agglomeration externalities (especially when 
cross-sectional level effects of population are much more important than its transitory 
changes). In order to assess the long-run cross-sectional contributions of each factor 
on the adjustment process, we regress the estimated city fixed effects from equation 
(15) on the average value of each variable over the sample period—i.e., a between 
regression but using the estimated city fixed effects as the dependent variable. As we 
do for the short-run regression models, we use IV in these estimations, though the 
Hausman tests indicate that endogeneity is not a serious concern.  
 The resulting long-run effects of city size on wage dispersion for the entire 
sample are reported in Table 3. As before, the city-size coefficient is robust across all 
models, while the other control variables are generally jointly significant when 
considering each control variable grouping, as shown by the corresponding F-statistic 
p-values at the bottom of the table. Regarding our key finding, the results suggest that 
agglomeration is negatively related to wage dispersion in the long run, which is not 
consistent with two-sided (productivity) sorting of firms, though it is consistent with 
selectivity in which low-productive firms are driven from the market in more 
populated cities with greater competition. Bringing the short-run and long-run results 
together, our initial finding is that city wage dispersion is enlarged after a shock in the 
short run but is negatively linked to population in the long-run.  
 
(2) Do Coastal-Inland Developmental Differences Produce Different Patterns? 
Given the large and persistent regional disparities in China, we ask whether the 
18 
 
relationship between city size and wage dispersion is heterogeneous across regions.9 
In particular, the coastal regions are more developed and their economies were 
exposed to market forces and FDI at a much earlier time than the inland. On one hand, 
we expect that greater coastal exposure to market forces and relatively high rates of 
mobility due to rural-urban migration would reduce firm wage dispersion in coastal 
cities as competitive forces arbitrage wage differentials. On the other hand, greater 
coastal exposure to market forces may have produced the two-sided firm sorting that 
has been observed elsewhere. In order to answer this question, we divide the country 
into coastal and inland regions.10 The coastal and inland panel (short-run) models are 
respectively reported in Table 4 and 5.11 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 near here  
 
 In the coastal panel models that reflect the short-run effects in Table 4, with 
exceptions in column (2) and (3), population is statistically insignificant, most notably 
in our base models in columns (5) and (6). Conversely, for the inland results in Table 
5, population is always positive and highly statistically significantly related to 
short-run wage dispersion. Thus, there appears to be key differences in how 
between-firm wage dispersion responds to short-run shocks to population. One 
possible explanation is that the labor market in the coastal region is well developed 
and labor can move quickly in response to exogenous shocks—i.e., labor can move 
between coastal cities to even out shocks and net flows with inland China may also 
change. Conversely, the less-developed inland-regional labor market is less 
responsive to shocks. In contrast to the migration flows that dominate the growth of 
coastal regions, in the inland, with a smaller response of labor to short-run demand 
shocks, wages must bear more of the adjustment process, in which expanding firms 
                                                             
9 For detailed discussion on China’s regional disparities, see Chen and Groenewold (2013, 2014), Herrerias and 
Monford (2015), and Li et al. (2017). 
10 We define cities in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangzhou, Hainan 
as the coastal region and the rest as inland following Lemoine et al. (2015).  
11 We note that the Hausman tests suggest that potential endogeneity is not serious for the coastal region but we 
still use IV estimation for the coastal region in order to compare with the other results. Nevertheless, when we 
rerun the regression for the coastal region with OLS, the results are consistent with those using IV.  
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raise their wages, increasing wage dispersion. In addition, the foreign share of local 
manufacturing is negatively associated with wage dispersion in the inland, which is 
further suggestive that as local economies open up, market forces work to narrow 
wage dispersion (assuming FDI is associated with more development).  
 Regarding the other results, Tables 4 and 5 indicate that city productivity, the 
public and foreign shares, capital-labor ratio, and inter-sector disparities are generally 
statistically significant. It is interesting that the dispersion of the capital/labor ratio is 
positively linked to inequality as expected, but its mean is negative and statistically 
significant. This pattern is inconsistent with the evidence in Piketty (2014), which 
finds that increasing payments to capital is the driving force of income disparities, 
though we caution that our results only apply to the city level and to firm averages. 
   
Table 6 near here  
 
 The long-run between models are reported in the first two rows of Table 6, in 
which the other variable results are suppressed for brevity. Recall that we expect that 
these longer-run effects are primarily driven by agglomeration. In the case of coastal 
cities, the population coefficient is positive and significant in all models indicating 
city size positively related to wage dispersion, consistent with agglomeration 
increasing wage disparities.  
On the contrary, city size has significantly negative effects on wage dispersion in 
the inland region in all models, in which the magnitude of the effects is larger than in 
coastal regions. One explanation is that in inland labor markets, larger cities have less 
wage disparities across firms because their labor markets are more developed and 
flexible than in small inland cities. Another explanation is consistent with the 
two-sided sorting models in that the most productive and least productive firms are 
moving from inland cities to the coast—reducing inland wage disparities across firms 
and increasing them in coastal cities.  
 Overall, these results illustrate how population shifts can be associated with very 
different effects in the short- and long-run. In addition, our finding how 
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agglomeration matters in China is somewhat consistent with Chauvin et al. (2017), 
who argue that agglomeration is more evident in developed economies. These 
findings suggest that there are other channels for agglomeration to affect city 
development. Another practical implication is that aggregating Chinese spatial data 
and estimating a model can produce misleading results.12 Because most of the 
observations are in the inland, it is not surprising that the aggregate results are fairly 
close to the inland results given the regression is producing results near the mean of 
the distribution. Thus, researchers should be cautious when using spatial data in China 
or they may draw conclusions that mainly reflect the inland, missing the key coastal 
region. 
 
(3) The Role of Private and Public Ownership 
Differing characteristics of private firms and SOEs may also affect wage disparities. 
Private firms would seemingly be more responsive to market forces. On one hand, 
public firms have less wage dispersion as wages are set for other reasons than just 
market forces. Yet, if governments use state-owned enterprises as a type of employer 
of last resort, then they may have higher wage dispersion in the long-run to help 
facilitate this purpose. Therefore, to assess whether private and public firms have 
differing responses to agglomeration, as well as whether different compositions of 
private and public firms explain the coastal/inland results, we re-estimate the 
regressions for the private firms and public firms respectively in coastal and inland 
regions.13 The short-run panel results for the coastal private and public firms are 
respectively reported in Tables 7-8 and the corresponding inland results are in Tables 
9-10.  
 
Table 7 and 8 near here  
 
 The results in Table 7 show that city size is negative but insignificant in the 
                                                             
12 Liu (2014) also finds differential effects across space in China though he focuses on human capital spillovers.  
13 We do not run the regression for the foreign firms since there are few foreign firms in many cities in the inland 
region.  
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estimation for coastal private firms. The share of public and foreign firms both have 
positive and significant effects on wage dispersion between private firms. While the 
private-firm mean capital/labor ratio is negatively related to city wage dispersion, the 
standard deviation of the capital/labor ratio is positively related. While the latter result 
is not necessarily surprising, the former result suggests that there may be some 
selection of unproductive firms out of the market, which reduces wage dispersion. 
Therefore, the distribution of capital intensity is correlated with wage distribution.  
 Most of the average firm characteristics for public firms are statistically 
insignificant when considered. One interesting result is that both the private-firm and 
public-firm inter-sectoral standard deviation is positively linked to private firm wage 
dispersion. This pattern appears to reflect spillovers from public firms to private firms. 
However, it is only the private-firm inter-sectoral standard deviation that is 
statistically significant, suggesting that public-sector wages do not spillover to 
private-firm wages.  
 The results for coastal public firms, which are included in Table 8, are very 
similar to those for coastal private firms. Again, city size is insignificant in all models. 
In contrast to the results for private firms, the wage gap between sectors for private 
firms has significant and positive effects on wage dispersion in public firms. 
Therefore, it seems that there are more spillovers from private firms to public firms 
than that from public firms to private firms in the coastal region.  
 
Table 9 and 10 near here 
  
The results for the inland public and private firms are similar to the entire inland 
sample. City size is positive and significant in all models. For private firms, city 
productivity has positive and significant effects on wage dispersion while education 
level has negative and significant effects. Most of the private-firm characteristics are 
significant. For public firms, city productivity also has positive and significant effects 
on wage dispersion but other control variables become insignificant in general. One 
interesting result is that in contrast to the coastal region, there are bi-direction 
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spillovers between public firms and private firms in the inland region.  
The long-run “between” effects of city size for each firm type in both regions are 
reported in rows 3 to 6 of Table 6. In the long run for the coastal region, the private 
and public population effects are positive and significant, which are similar to the 
coastal region as a whole in Row 1. In both the private and public samples for the 
inland region, population is negative and statistically related to wage dispersion. As 
with the coastal region, the private and public city-size results have a similar pattern 
as the entire inland sample results shown in row 2. Taken as a whole, the results 
suggest that the differing coastal/inland region results are not due to differing 
private/public ownership distributions.  
 
(4) Are There Large/Small City Differences？ 
Given that cities in the inland region are relatively smaller than those in the coastal 
region, it is possible that our findings could be driven by small cities dominating the 
sample. In order to test this hypothesis, we use the top 150 large cities to re-estimate 
the models and include an interaction term between city size and dummy for inland 
cities (CitySize*Inland).14 If it is really smaller cities driving the previous results, we 
would expect that the interaction term would be statistically insignificant. However, if 
our hypothesized inland-coastal story is correct, the interaction term would be 
significant and the population coefficient would respectively be insignificant in the 
short-run panel model and positive and significant in the long-run “between” model. 
The short run results are reported in Table 11 and the long-run results are reported in 
the last row of Table 6. 
 
Table 11 near here.  
 
 The short-run panel results indicate that the main city-size coefficient is 
statistically insignificant and the population-inland interaction term is positive and 
                                                             
14 We have 336 cities in the sample, so 150 cities are just under 50% of the sample. We also run the estimations for 
top 50, 100 and 200 cities, in which the results are robust.  
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significant. The insignificant result of the city size variable corresponds to our 
previous findings for the coast and the significance of the interaction term is 
consistent with our results for inland regions. Therefore, our findings support our 
hypothesis of an inland-coastal division rather than a small-large city division.  
 For the long-run results shown in the last row of Table 5, the main population 
coefficient is typically positive and significant, which is supportive of our previous 
coastal results. The long-run interaction terms are negative and significant, consistent 
with our prior long-run model findings for the inland. Thus, our conclusion is that our 
results are consistent with a level of development story in the coast and inland regions 
and they are not altered by examining large cities in isolation.  
 
(5) Wage Dispersion within Sector  
Given that inter-sectoral wage dispersion has significant effects in all the estimations 
above, we ask whether the relationship between city size and wage dispersion still 
exists if we eliminate the effects of inter-sectoral wage dispersion directly by 
estimating a model with within-sector wage dispersion being the dependent variable. 
We first compute the standard deviation of log wage across firms within each sector in 
each city and then estimate a city-sector panel data model that includes sector and city 
fixed effects (i.e., for every city, there is an observation for each of the individual 30 
manufacturing sectors). The results are summarized in Table 12.  
 
Table 12 about here 
 
It is clear that the relationship between city size and within-sector wage dispersion is 
positive and significant in the short run and negative and significant in the long run 
for the full sample. For the coastal region, the coefficient of city size is negative but 
generally insignificant and positive and significant in the long run. The results for the 
inland region is very similar to the whole country. Thus, we conclude that the results 
reported in the previous sections are generally robust to alternative specifications of 
wage dispersion. 
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(6) Who Are Winners and Who Are Losers? 
The wage standard deviation we use above is a good measure to show the change in 
wage distribution but it cannot tell us who are the relative winners/losers in the short- 
and long-run. To assess this, we examine wage ratios at different parts of the 
distribution. Specifically for each city, we calculate the firm-wage 90th percentile to 
the firm-wage 10th percentile ratio, the 90/50 wage ratio, and the 50/10 wage ratio. We 
now use these ratios as the dependent variable. The results are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 near here 
 
 The short-run panel results are reported in columns 1, 3, and 5. The first finding 
for the overall China results are relatively close to the inland results, which is 
consistent with the standard deviation results. Thus, we focus on the coastal and 
inland results. The coastal results are pretty clear in that across firms, population has 
statistically insignificant effects across all three ratios, suggesting that there are no 
short-term distributional effects from population shocks on the distribution of average 
firm wages. However, this is not the case in the inland results. In this case, short-run 
labor demand shocks are positively associated with the 90/10 and 50/10 ratios at the 1% 
significance level, but the 90/50 city-size results are nearly insignificant. Hence, 
positive short-term labor demand shocks tend to increase wages relatively uniformly 
in the upper-half of the distribution. One implication is that local demand shocks 
increase average wages for higher-paying inland firms, but they have smaller or even 
negative effects for firms at the 10th percentile. One suggestion is that this implies that 
lower-paying inland firms are not benefiting from favorable demand shocks.  
 Turning to the long-run “between” results, in columns 2, 4, and 6, the coastal 
distributional effects are positive and significant, suggesting that agglomeration 
affects the wage distribution. However, the inland results suggest that population is 
negatively associated with all three ratios. This pattern suggests that long-term 
agglomeration effects increase average wages at the top and the middle, though the 
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top does better than the middle. They also decrease relative wages in the bottom for 
firms in coastal cities. On the contrary, long-term agglomeration dampens average 
firm wages at the top, reduces relative wages in the middle, though the middle does 
better than the 90th percentile. It also increases relative wages at the 10th percentile in 
inland cities. This result is consistent with two-sided sorting out from the largest 
inland cities to the largest coastal cities. If the most productive and highest paying 
inland firms, as well as the least-productive and lowest-paying inland firms, move to 
the coast, the average wage at the 10th percentile would rise in the inland and fall in 
the coastal region. Wages at the 90th percentile would fall in the inland and rise in the 
coastal region. Overall, agglomeration has very spatially distinct distributional effects 
on firm wages across China.  
 
6. Conclusion 
China is experiencing rapid urbanization with the steady emergence of large cities, 
leading to policy discussions of the role of large cities in the country’s development. 
There is a large related literature that documents the role of city size on productivity 
and wage premiums. While the consensus is that agglomeration plays an important 
role in economic development and large cities can act as engines of economic growth, 
there is relatively little empirical knowledge of the effects of agglomeration on 
inequality. This is an important gap in the literature: given that high-productivity firms 
and low-productivity firms may both sort to large cities, the continuing rapid growth 
of large cities may further increase Chinese income inequality, which is already at 
high levels. Thus, there is an urgent need to understand how China’s spatial 
development is affecting income inequality. 
This study assesses these issues. We start by using a simplified version of NEG 
models that allow for “footloose capital” to describe our conceptual framework 
relating city size to firm wage dispersion. We then apply panel data from a micro 
firm-level survey and from city-level data to investigate whether there is a causal 
relationship between agglomeration and establishment wage dispersion. We not only 
examine the short-run linkages between city size and wage dispersion, but also assess 
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their long-run relationship to investigate whether the effects have temporal variation. 
Given potential endogeneity of city size, we employ an instrumental variable 
regression (IV) approach. 
We find strong evidence that agglomeration has positive effects on wage 
dispersion in the short run and negative effects in the long run for the whole country. 
The relationship between city size and wage dispersion is heterogeneous across 
regions. The inland city results are close to the overall China results, which are driven 
mainly by a smaller response in labor markets to demand shocks. For the coastal cities, 
the city size coefficient is insignificant in the short run and positive and significant in 
the long run, consistent with agglomeration increasing wage disparities. The differing 
regional results are not due to differing private/public ownership distributions. Rather, 
these differences appear to be due to differing stages of development. These findings 
suggest that there are other channels for agglomeration to affect city development and 
that aggregating Chinese spatial data and estimating a model can produce misleading 
results. 
We also find that agglomeration has very spatially distinct distributional effects 
on wages. For the coastal cities, the long run distribution effects are positive and 
significant, though the short-run results were insignificant. For the inland cities, the 
positive short-term labor demand shocks tend to increase wages relatively uniformly 
in the upper-half of the distribution, while long-term agglomeration effects dampen 
average firm wages at the top and middle of the distribution and increase relative 
wages for firms at the bottom. Overall, our results are consistent with two-sided 
sorting models in that the most productive and least productive firms are moving from 
inland cities to the coast—reducing inland wage disparities across firms and 
increasing them in coastal cities in the long run. 
Our findings indicate that the Chinese urban development strategy could be 
redirected if income inequality is an important concern. The government should 
consider both the temporal and spatial differential effects of agglomeration when 
making city development planning. At present most of the large cities are 
concentrated in the coastal region where agglomeration increases firm wage 
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dispersion in the long run, though the short run effects are insignificant. On the 
contrary, wage dispersion can be reduced as city size increases in the inland region 
but there are too many small cities. Therefore, it could be helpful to use policy 
instruments to influence urbanization, especially the development of large cities in the 
inland region, at least for the sake of reducing income inequality.  
There are at least two directions that the current research could be extended. First, 
we do not provide direct evidences that both the high- and low-productivity firms 
move to large cities as predicted by the theoretical model. It will be promising to use 
micro data to examine the influence of agglomeration on reallocation decisions of 
heterogeneous firms. Second, we focus on manufacturing firms but it is likely that the 
effects of agglomeration on firms in other sectors like the service sector is different. 
Given that the role of the service sector is increasingly important in (urban) China, it 
is urgent to know whether agglomeration increases or decreases wage inequality 
within this sector. We leave these issues for future research.  
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Figure 1. The correlation of within-city firm-wage dispersion and city population 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variables count mean s.d. min max 
WageDis 3011 0.614 0.216 0.068 2.617 
CitySize 3011 5.634 0.848 2.553 8.030 
GDP-Per-Capita 3011 9.021 0.761 6.730 12.464 
Average-Education 3011 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.031 
IND2  3011 0.222 0.122 0.005 0.820 
Public-Share  3011 0.535 0.280 0.000 1.000 
Foreign-Share 3011 0.121 0.162 0.000 0.885 
lnL-mean 3011 6.456 0.845 2.308 10.534 
lnL-SD 3011 1.335 0.353 0.141 3.063 
lnK/L-mean 3011 4.924 0.508 2.875 7.557 
lnK/L-SD 3011 1.003 0.220 0.118 2.550 
lnWage-ind-SD 3011 0.352 0.161 0.000 1.875 
Notes: WageDis is the standard deviation of log wage across manufacturing firms within city. CitySize is log 
population. GDP-Per-Capita is log real GDP per capita. Average-Education is the ratio of university graduates to 
population. IND2 is the share of employment in the secondary industry. Public-Share is the share of manufacturing 
employment of state-own enterprises (SOE) and collective ownership enterprises (COE). Foreign-Share is the 
share of manufacturing employment accounted by foreign firms. lnL-mean is the mean of log firm employment. 
lnL-SD is the standard deviation of log firm employment. lnK/L-mean is the mean of the log firm capital-labor 
ratio. lnK/L-SD is the standard deviation of the log firm capital-labor ratio. LnWage-ind-SD is the standard 
deviation of log wage between manufacturing sectors.  
Sources: China Industrial Firm Survey (NBS, various years) and China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy 
(NBS, various years). 
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Table 2: Short Run Panel Results (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CitySize 0.555*** 0.604*** 0.592*** 0.693*** 0.642*** 0.494*** 
 (0.176) (0.187) (0.193) (0.214) (0.215) (0.170) 
GDP-Per-Capita  0.149*** 0.146*** 0.153*** 0.144*** 0.121*** 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.037) (0.036) (0.031) 
Average-Education  -0.349 -0.316 -1.488 -1.545 -3.554* 
  (2.582) (2.565) (2.792) (2.535) (1.975) 
Public-Share   0.016  0.098 -0.003 
   (0.065)  (0.060) (0.039) 
Foreign-Share   -0.032  -0.171 -0.240*** 
   (0.106)  (0.105) (0.079) 
IND2   -0.003  -0.106 -0.049 
   (0.152)  (0.113) (0.070) 
lnL-mean    0.017 0.014 -0.004 
    (0.025) (0.024) (0.014) 
lnL-SD    0.021 0.017 0.001 
    (0.039) (0.040) (0.030) 
lnK/L-mean    -0.051* -0.063** -0.058*** 
    (0.029) (0.029) (0.021) 
lnK/L-SD    0.466*** 0.473*** 0.244*** 
    (0.048) (0.047) (0.031) 
lnWage-ind-SD      0.899*** 
      (0.038) 
Constant -3.395*** -5.349*** -5.235*** -6.471*** -5.859*** -4.355*** 
 (1.296) (1.591) (1.629) (1.733) (1.742) (1.408) 
City-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3011 3011 3011 3011 3011 3011 
R2 0.493 0.497 0.498 0.584 0.590 0.779 
Hausman-P 0.010 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.033 0.029 
Wid-Statistics 88.341 73.640 71.182 61.468 62.421 62.279 
p-value-1  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value-2   0.974  0.018 0.008 
p-value-3    0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value-4      0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within-city standard deviation of log wage across manufacturing firms. 
Standard errors clustered by city are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hausman-P is the p value 
of Hausman’s endogeneity test statistics. Wid-Statistics is the F-statistics of IV in the first-stage regression. The 
last four rows report the joint significance of GDP per capita and city education, industrial and ownership structure 
variables, firm’s characteristics variables, and inter-sector wage disparities respectively. Specifically, p-value-1 is 
the p value of joint significance of GDP-Per-Capita and Average-Education, p-value-2 is the p value of joint 
significance of Public-Share, Foreign-Share and IND2, p-value-3 is the p value of joint significance of lnL-mean, 
lnL-SD, lnK/L-mean and lnK/L-SD, and p-value-4 is the p value of significance of lnWage-ind-SD.  
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Table 3: Long Run Results (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CitySize -0.484*** -0.528*** -0.496*** -0.704*** -0.625*** -0.608*** -0.444*** 
 (0.036) (0.045) (0.043) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) 
GDP-Per-Capita  -0.165*** -0.147*** -0.217*** -0.143*** -0.132*** -0.081*** 
  (0.013) (0.024) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) 
Average-Education  3.086 -4.152 6.398** 0.543 0.827 1.042 
  (4.511) (4.140) (2.653) (2.409) (2.063) (1.726) 
Public-Share   0.291***  0.200*** 0.011 0.066* 
   (0.056)  (0.043) (0.046) (0.036) 
Foreign-Share   0.131**  0.124** -0.061 0.097** 
   (0.065)  (0.051) (0.057) (0.048) 
IND2   0.065  0.056 0.049 0.023 
   (0.206)  (0.080) (0.073) (0.055) 
lnL-mean    -0.024 -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.020*** 
    (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) 
lnL-SD    0.062* 0.036 0.045* 0.006 
    (0.035) (0.031) (0.027) (0.018) 
lnK/L-mean    0.061*** 0.019 0.042** 0.016 
    (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) 
lnK/L-SD    -0.010 -0.032 -0.134*** -0.104*** 
    (0.042) (0.038) (0.039) (0.030) 
lnWage-ind-SD       -0.270*** 
       (0.043) 
Constant 3.508*** 5.512*** 4.966*** 6.988*** 5.976*** 5.912*** 4.261*** 
 (0.212) (0.319) (0.232) (0.138) (0.148) (0.133) (0.109) 
Provincial fixed 
effects 
No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 336 336 336 335 335 335 335 
R2 0.836 0.845 0.850 0.975 0.974 0.984 0.981 
Hausman-P 0.053 0.152 0.049 0.208 0.318 0.120 0.472 
Wid-Statistics 14701 26614 22607 14396 15017 9530 8049 
p-value-1  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value-2   0.000  0.000 0.650 0.112 
p-value-3    0.001 0.039 0.000 0.001 
p-value-4       0.000 
Notes: The dependent variables are the fixed effects estimated from equation 15. The independent variables are 
those averaged in the sample period. Standard errors clustered by city are in parentheses . * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01. The first four columns correspond to the first four models in Table 2 and the fifth and sixth columns 
correspond to the fifth model in Table 2 and the last column correspond to the sixth column in Table 2. Hausman-P 
is the p value of Hausman’s endogeneity test statistics. Wid-Statistics is the F-statistics of IV in the first-stage 
regression. The last four rows report the joint significance of GDP per capita and city education, industrial and 
ownership structure variables, firm’s characteristics variables, and inter-sector wage disparities respectively. 
Specifically, p-value-1 is the p value of joint significance of GDP-Per-Capita and Average-Education, p-value-2 is 
the p value of joint significance of Public-Share, Foreign-Share and IND2, p-value-3 is the p value of joint 
significance of lnL-mean, lnL-SD, lnK/L-mean and lnK/L-SD, and p-value-4 is the p value of significance of 
lnWage-ind-SD.  
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Table 4: Short Run Panel Results (Coastal Cities) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CitySize -0.204 -0.344* -0.598* -0.065 -0.287 -0.125 
 (0.147) (0.207) (0.309) (0.227) (0.279) (0.223) 
GDP-Per-Capita  0.124** 0.145** 0.109* 0.117* 0.123** 
  (0.061) (0.057) (0.065) (0.066) (0.050) 
Average-Education  12.519** 10.183 8.264* 6.682 2.909 
  (6.178) (6.527) (4.700) (4.903) (3.342) 
Public-Share   0.343**  0.352*** 0.150* 
   (0.136)  (0.100) (0.083) 
Foreign-Share   0.595**  0.208 0.015 
   (0.240)  (0.173) (0.142) 
IND2   -0.223  -0.084 -0.010 
   (0.165)  (0.137) (0.116) 
lnL-mean    0.093** 0.055 0.017 
    (0.039) (0.038) (0.031) 
lnL-SD    -0.014 0.029 -0.008 
    (0.067) (0.066) (0.048) 
lnK/L-mean    -0.097* -0.091* -0.090** 
    (0.053) (0.053) (0.038) 
lnK/L-SD    0.666*** 0.675*** 0.415*** 
    (0.104) (0.106) (0.077) 
lnWage-ind-SD      0.845*** 
      (0.105) 
Constant 2.371** 2.063 3.377 -0.687 0.694 -0.007 
 (1.075) (1.589) (2.185) (1.728) (2.071) (1.636) 
City-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 783 783 783 783 783 783 
R2 0.595 0.601 0.609 0.755 0.757 0.835 
Hausman-P 0.011 0.012 0.029 0.109 0.038 0.208 
Wid-Statistics 24.006 19.603 16.777 11.806 12.587 12.769 
p-value-1  0.018 0.014 0.045 0.078 0.031 
p-value-2   0.008  0.006 0.322 
p-value-3    0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value-4      0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within-city standard deviation of log wage across manufacturing firms. 
Standard errors clustered by city are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hausman-P is the p value 
of Hausman’s endogeneity test statistics. Wid-Statistics is the F-statistics of IV in the first-stage regression. The 
last four rows report the joint significance of GDP per capita and city education, industrial and ownership structure 
variables, firm’s characteristics variables, and inter-sector wage disparities respectively. Specifically, p-value-1 is 
the p value of joint significance of GDP-Per-Capita and Average-Education, p-value-2 is the p value of joint 
significance of Public-Share, Foreign-Share and IND2, p-value-3 is the p value of joint significance of lnL-mean, 
lnL-SD, lnK/L-mean and lnK/L-SD, and p-value-4 is the p value of significance of lnWage-ind-SD.  
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Table 5: Short Run Panel Results (Inland Cities) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CitySize 1.025*** 1.111*** 1.079*** 1.134*** 1.104*** 0.835*** 
 (0.264) (0.267) (0.272) (0.315) (0.311) (0.241) 
GDP-Per-Capita  0.215*** 0.208*** 0.225*** 0.214*** 0.168*** 
  (0.065) (0.065) (0.061) (0.060) (0.052) 
Average-Education  -2.574 -1.726 -2.569 -2.271 -4.463 
  (3.312) (3.256) (3.652) (3.336) (2.714) 
Public-Share   -0.001  0.087 -0.008 
   (0.080)  (0.071) (0.045) 
Foreign-Share   -0.149  -0.255** -0.284*** 
   (0.108)  (0.120) (0.096) 
IND2   0.107  -0.034 0.004 
   (0.190)  (0.145) (0.091) 
lnL-mean    0.008 0.001 -0.009 
    (0.030) (0.031) (0.017) 
lnL-SD    0.029 0.021 0.016 
    (0.046) (0.048) (0.037) 
lnK/L-mean    -0.088** -0.098*** -0.085*** 
    (0.037) (0.036) (0.026) 
lnK/L-SD    0.397*** 0.404*** 0.190*** 
    (0.050) (0.049) (0.032) 
lnWage-ind-SD      0.894*** 
      (0.041) 
Constant -5.354*** -7.833*** -7.615*** -8.077*** -7.750*** -5.813*** 
 (1.564) (1.884) (1.890) (2.081) (2.055) (1.630) 
City-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2228 2228 2228 2228 2228 2228 
R2 0.429 0.434 0.438 0.514 0.521 0.752 
Hausman-P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Wid-Statistics 71.048 68.027 64.239 59.457 57.382 56.924 
p-value-1  0.004 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.003 
p-value-2   0.502  0.030 0.026 
p-value-3    0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value-4      0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within-city standard deviation of log wage across manufacturing firms. 
Standard errors clustered by city are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hausman-P is the p value 
of Hausman’s endogeneity test statistics. Wid-Statistics is the F-statistics of IV in the first-stage regression. The 
last four rows report the joint significance of GDP per capita and city education, industrial and ownership structure 
variables, firm’s characteristics variables, and inter-sector wage disparities respectively. Specifically, p-value-1 is 
the p value of joint significance of GDP-Per-Capita and Average-Education, p-value-2 is the p value of joint 
significance of Public-Share, Foreign-Share and IND2, p-value-3 is the p value of joint significance of lnL-mean, 
lnL-SD, lnK/L-mean and lnK/L-SD, and p-value-4 is the p value of significance of lnWage-ind-SD.  
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Table 6: Long Run Effects  
Panel A: Coastal and Inland Division 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model(4) Model(5) Model(5)+ Model(6)+ 
Coast 0.260*** 0.374*** 0.665*** 0.107*** 0.347*** 0.329*** 0.169*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) 
Inland -0.924*** -0.989*** -0.959*** -1.143*** -1.088*** -1.068*** -0.786*** 
 (0.061) (0.078) (0.070) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) 
Panel B: Private and Public Firms Division in Two Regions 
 Model (1) Model(2)  Model (3) Model (4) Model(5) Model (6)+ Model (7)+ 
Coast-Private 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.294*** -0.089*** 0.048*** 0.088*** 0.470*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.025) 
Coast-Public 0.293*** 0.454*** 0.830*** 0.431*** 0.710*** 0.605*** 0.379*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) 
Inland-Private -0.658*** -0.722*** -0.800*** -1.017*** -1.058*** -1.150*** -1.012*** 
 (0.061) (0.082) (0.072) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.046) 
Inland-Public -0.758*** -0.816*** -0.769*** -0.946*** -0.991*** -0.934*** -0.827*** 
 (0.051) (0.065) (0.058) (0.073) (0.042) (0.013) (0.040) 
Panel C: Large and Small City Difference 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model(4) Model(5) Model(5)+ Model(6)+ 
CitySize 0.234*** 0.230*** 0.380*** 0.039 0.181*** 0.230*** 0.319*** 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.029) (0.026) (0.040) (0.037) 
Interaction  -1.629*** -1.648*** -1.693*** -1.388*** -1.357*** -1.386*** -1.134*** 
Term (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.047) (0.045) 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and their standard errors (clustered by city) for the city size variable. The 
dependent variables are fixed effects estimated from equation (15). The independent variables are those averaged 
in the sample period. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Panel A corresponds to the models in Table 4 and 5. 
Panel B corresponds to the models in Table 7-10. Panel C corresponds to the model in Table 11. “+” means that 
provincial dummy variable is included in the estimation.  
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Table 7: Short Run Panel Results (Private Firms in Coastal Cities) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CitySize -0.053 -0.064 -0.231 0.101 -0.015 -0.048 -0.424 
 (0.179) (0.206) (0.267) (0.283) (0.271) (0.242) (0.274) 
GDP-Per-Capita  0.029 0.040 -0.014 -0.019 -0.015 -0.009 
  (0.066) (0.054) (0.070) (0.058) (0.058) (0.067) 
Average-Education  1.240 -0.667 1.137 -1.190 -1.664 2.968 
  (3.720) (3.530) (3.309) (3.305) (3.217) (3.583) 
Public-Share   0.259*  0.288** 0.358** 0.355** 
   (0.146)  (0.143) (0.143) (0.150) 
Foreign-Share   0.546***  0.518** 0.539*** 0.329* 
   (0.192)  (0.217) (0.207) (0.199) 
IND2   -0.110  -0.105 -0.074 -0.095 
   (0.173)  (0.150) (0.147) (0.161) 
lnL-mean-private    0.010 0.007 -0.001 -0.000 
    (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.039) 
lnL-SD-private    0.025 0.066 0.082 0.069 
    (0.063) (0.067) (0.071) (0.072) 
lnK/L-mean-private    -0.061 -0.046 -0.060* -0.071* 
    (0.039) (0.036) (0.036) (0.042) 
lnK/L-SD-private    0.449*** 0.453*** 0.453*** 0.553*** 
    (0.128) (0.124) (0.123) (0.143) 
lnL-mean-public      0.007 -0.010 
      (0.020) (0.019) 
lnL-SD-public      -0.086* -0.032 
      (0.049) (0.050) 
lnK/L-mean-public      0.028 -0.010 
      (0.029) (0.031) 
lnK/L-SD-public      -0.016 -0.100* 
      (0.045) (0.053) 
lnWage-ind-SD-private       0.297*** 
       (0.069) 
LnWage-ind-SD-public       0.036 
       (0.044) 
Constant 1.049 0.828 1.660 -0.202 0.304 0.519 3.369 
 (1.305) (1.795) (2.077) (2.097) (2.003) (1.860) (2.055) 
City-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 783 783 783 783 783 783 659 
R2 0.457 0.457 0.466 0.545 0.556 0.559 0.641 
Hausman-P 0.091 0.117 0.245 0.618 0.803 0.708 0.024 
Wid-Statistics 24.006 19.603 16.777 17.737 16.711 21.548 18.804 
p-value-1  0.811 0.757 0.926 0.886 0.829 0.706 
p-value-2   0.004  0.037 0.007 0.035 
p-value-3    0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
p-value-4      0.388 0.397 
p-value-5       0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within-city standard deviation of log wage across private manufacturing firms 
in the coastal region. Standard errors clustered by city are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Hausman-P is the p value of Hausman’s endogeneity test statistics. Wid-Statistics is the F-statistics of IV in the 
first-stage regression. The last five rows report the joint significance of GDP per capita and city education, 
industrial and ownership structure variables, firm’s characteristics variables, and inter-sector wage disparities 
respectively. Specifically, p-value-1 is the p value of joint significance of GDP-Per-Capita and Average-Education, 
p-value-2 is the p value of joint significance of Public-Share, Foreign-Share and IND2, p-value-3 is the p value of 
joint significance of lnL-mean-private, lnL-SD-private, lnK/L-mean-private and lnK/L-SD-private, p-value-4 is the 
p value of joint significance of lnL-mean-public, lnL-SD-public, lnK/L-mean-public and lnK/L-SD-public, and 
p-value-5 is the p value of joint significance of lnWage-ind-SD-private and lnWage-ind-SD-public.  
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Table 8: Short Run Panel Results (Public Firms in Coastal Cities) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CitySize -0.241 -0.421 -0.759* -0.444 -0.741 -0.559 -0.327 
 (0.242) (0.337) (0.449) (0.448) (0.532) (0.489) (0.365) 
GDP-Per-Capita  0.120* 0.147** 0.102 0.131* 0.105 0.034 
  (0.072) (0.070) (0.084) (0.080) (0.075) (0.079) 
Average-Education  15.531** 13.398* 12.385* 9.268 7.758 5.875 
  (6.647) (6.866) (7.020) (7.066) (6.693) (5.539) 
Public-Share   0.404***  0.427*** 0.408*** 0.280** 
   (0.151)  (0.130) (0.140) (0.127) 
Foreign-Share   0.494**  0.495** 0.478** 0.307* 
   (0.212)  (0.208) (0.206) (0.176) 
IND2   -0.282  -0.218 -0.225 -0.077 
   (0.224)  (0.209) (0.207) (0.199) 
lnL-mean-public    0.021 0.015 0.016 0.044 
    (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031) 
lnL-SD-public    0.021 -0.001 0.002 -0.024 
    (0.053) (0.059) (0.061) (0.065) 
lnK/L-mean-public    -0.041 -0.014 -0.025 -0.030 
    (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) 
lnK/L-SD-public    0.295*** 0.298*** 0.304*** 0.336*** 
    (0.080) (0.082) (0.077) (0.085) 
lnL-mean-private      -0.000 0.020 
      (0.031) (0.036) 
lnL-SD-private      -0.006 0.007 
      (0.062) (0.064) 
lnK/L-mean-private      0.046 0.020 
      (0.040) (0.040) 
lnK/L-SD-private      0.059 0.002 
      (0.060) (0.059) 
lnWage-ind-SD-private       0.202*** 
       (0.060) 
LnWage-ind-SD-public       0.255*** 
       (0.045) 
Constant 2.443 2.443 4.287 2.525 3.980 2.710 1.602 
 (1.766) (2.477) (3.035) (3.320) (3.742) (3.455) (2.623) 
City-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 783 783 783 783 783 783 659 
R2 0.514 0.519 0.517 0.564 0.562 0.576 0.649 
Hausman-P 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.018 
Wid-Statistics 24.006 19.603 16.777 23.485 21.454 21.548 18.804 
p-value-1  0.013 0.023 0.112 0.147 0.235 0.539 
p-value-2   0.031  0.006 0.020 0.129 
p-value-3    0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 
p-value-4      0.777 0.810 
p-value-5       0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within-city standard deviation of log wage across public manufacturing firms 
in the coastal region. Standard errors clustered by city are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Hausman-P is the p value of Hausman’s endogeneity test statistics. Wid-Statistics is the F-statistics of IV in the 
first-stage regression. The last five rows report the joint significance of GDP per capita and city education, 
industrial and ownership structure variables, firm’s characteristics variables, and inter-sector wage disparities 
respectively. Specifically, p-value-1 is the p value of joint significance of GDP-Per-Capita and Average-Education, 
p-value-2 is the p value of joint significance of Public-Share, Foreign-Share and IND2, p-value-3 is the p value of 
joint significance of lnL-mean-public, lnL-SD-public, lnK/L-mean-public and lnK/L-SD-public, p-value-4 is the p 
value of joint significance of lnL-mean-private, lnL-SD-private, lnK/L-mean-private and lnK/L-SD-private, and 
p-value-5 is the p value of joint significance of lnWage-ind-SD-private and lnWage-ind-SD-public.  
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Table 9: Short Run Panel Results (Private Firms in Inland Cities) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CitySize 0.847** 0.984*** 1.046*** 1.028*** 1.077*** 1.201*** 1.166** 
 (0.343) (0.376) (0.394) (0.378) (0.398) (0.382) (0.463) 
GDP-Per-Capita  0.214*** 0.233*** 0.205*** 0.218*** 0.241*** 0.300*** 
  (0.069) (0.074) (0.071) (0.075) (0.081) (0.099) 
Average-Education  -16.890*** -14.972*** -14.441*** -13.672*** -14.375*** -17.537*** 
  (5.234) (4.904) (5.002) (4.686) (4.718) (5.328) 
Public-Share   -0.179**  -0.105 -0.145* -0.167* 
   (0.089)  (0.084) (0.082) (0.091) 
Foreign-Share   -0.137  -0.070 -0.068 -0.171 
   (0.183)  (0.180) (0.177) (0.156) 
IND2   -0.096  -0.081 -0.088 -0.150 
   (0.198)  (0.175) (0.181) (0.197) 
lnL-mean-private    -0.013 -0.018 -0.019 -0.041* 
    (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
lnL-SD-private    0.106*** 0.101*** 0.097** 0.102** 
    (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) 
lnK/L-mean-private    -0.139*** -0.138*** -0.144*** -0.149*** 
    (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.026) 
lnK/L-SD-private    0.196*** 0.195*** 0.197*** 0.156*** 
    (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) 
lnL-mean-public      0.020 0.020 
      (0.022) (0.022) 
lnL-SD-public      -0.017 -0.020 
      (0.052) (0.051) 
lnK/L-mean-public      -0.011 -0.017 
      (0.027) (0.023) 
lnK/L-SD-public      -0.035 -0.055* 
      (0.030) (0.032) 
lnWage-ind-SD-private       0.391*** 
       (0.101) 
LnWage-ind-SD-public       0.129*** 
       (0.032) 
Constant -4.332** -6.977*** -7.315*** -6.746*** -6.992*** -7.917*** -8.139** 
 (2.028) (2.595) (2.706) (2.598) (2.692) (2.633) (3.311) 
City-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2107 2107 2107 2107 2107 2097 1821 
R2 0.311 0.317 0.316 0.383 0.381 0.375 0.506 
Hausman-P 0.013 0.018 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.001 0.003 
Wid-Statistics 57.832 54.040 50.834 54.363 50.165 49.826 33.518 
p-value-1  0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
p-value-2   0.246  0.604 0.318 0.246 
p-value-3    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value-4      0.678 0.444 
p-value-5       0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within-city standard deviation of log wage across private manufacturing firms 
in the inland region. Standard errors clustered by city are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Hausman-P is the p value of Hausman’s endogeneity test statistics. Wid-Statistics is the F-statistics of IV in the 
first-stage regression. The last five rows report the joint significance of GDP per capita and city education, 
industrial and ownership structure variables, firm’s characteristics variables, and inter-sector wage disparities 
respectively. Specifically, p-value-1 is the p value of joint significance of of GDP-Per-Capita and 
Average-Education, p-value-2 is the p value of joint significance of Public-Share, Foreign-Share and IND2, 
p-value-3 is the p value of joint significance of lnL-mean-private, lnL-SD-private, lnK/L-mean-private and 
lnK/L-SD-private, p-value-4 is the p value of joint significance of lnL-mean-public, lnL-SD-public, 
lnK/L-mean-public and lnK/L-SD-public, and p-value-5 is the p value of joint significance of 
lnWage-ind-SD-private and lnWage-ind-SD-public.  
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Table 10: Short Run Panel Results (Public Firms in Inland Cities) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CitySize 0.857*** 0.934*** 0.880*** 0.946*** 0.862*** 1.000*** 0.955*** 
 (0.266) (0.275) (0.284) (0.289) (0.292) (0.345) (0.352) 
GDP-Per-Capita  0.181*** 0.170*** 0.194*** 0.172*** 0.173** 0.213** 
  (0.064) (0.062) (0.058) (0.055) (0.070) (0.085) 
Average-Education  1.080 1.128 2.398 2.083 -0.047 -3.531 
  (3.780) (3.684) (3.824) (3.601) (3.847) (3.578) 
Public-Share   0.044  0.133* 0.166** 0.095 
   (0.080)  (0.074) (0.075) (0.073) 
Foreign-Share   -0.010  -0.053 -0.034 -0.099 
   (0.117)  (0.124) (0.142) (0.134) 
IND2   0.199  0.173 0.092 0.025 
   (0.185)  (0.166) (0.169) (0.143) 
lnL-mean-public    -0.012 -0.027 -0.035 -0.029 
    (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
lnL-SD-public    0.026 0.028 0.023 -0.003 
    (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) 
lnK/L-mean-public    -0.042* -0.042* -0.038 -0.050** 
    (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) 
lnK/L-SD-public    0.302*** 0.305*** 0.288*** 0.245*** 
    (0.044) (0.043) (0.048) (0.051) 
lnL-mean-private      0.026 0.007 
      (0.019) (0.019) 
lnL-SD-private      -0.034 -0.016 
      (0.036) (0.034) 
lnK/L-mean-private      0.003 -0.004 
      (0.020) (0.020) 
lnK/L-SD-private      0.023 0.003 
      (0.026) (0.030) 
lnWage-ind-SD-private       0.079** 
       (0.040) 
LnWage-ind-SD-public       0.335*** 
       (0.039) 
Constant -4.381*** -6.528*** -6.224*** -6.718*** -6.087*** -6.982*** -6.866*** 
 (1.575) (1.951) (1.962) (2.052) (2.059) (2.407) (2.589) 
City-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2218 2218 2218 2218 2218 2097 1821 
R2 0.451 0.454 0.459 0.512 0.521 0.530 0.593 
Hausman-P 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.003 
Wid-Statistics 69.462 64.801 60.098 66.610 61.920 49.826 33.518 
p-value-1  0.010 0.012 0.001 0.002 0.027 0.041 
p-value-2   0.742  0.228 0.057 0.265 
p-value-3    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value-4      0.514 0.985 
p-value-5       0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within-city standard deviation of log wage across public manufacturing firms 
in the inland region. Standard errors clustered by city are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Hausman-P is the p value of Hausman’s endogeneity test statistics. Wid-Statistics is the F-statistics of IV in the 
first-stage regression. The last five rows report the joint significance of GDP per capita and city education, 
industrial and ownership structure variables, firm’s characteristics variables, and inter-sector wage disparities 
respectively. Specifically, p-value-1 is the p value of joint significance of GDP-Per-Capita and Average-Education, 
p-value-2 is the p value of joint significance of Public-Share, Foreign-Share and IND2, p-value-3 is the p value of 
joint significance of lnL-mean-public, lnL-SD-public, lnK/L-mean-public and lnK/L-SD-public, p-value-4 is the p 
value of joint significance of lnL-mean-private, lnL-SD-private, lnK/L-mean-private and lnK/L-SD-private, and 
p-value-5 is the p value of joint significance of lnWage-ind-SD-private and lnWage-ind-SD-public.  
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Table 11: Full Sample with Inland-Population Interaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CitySize -0.172 -0.174 -0.318 -0.014 -0.156 -0.262 
 (0.200) (0.194) (0.216) (0.184) (0.208) (0.189) 
CitySize*Inland 1.637*** 1.652*** 1.688*** 1.390** 1.352** 1.174** 
 (0.612) (0.601) (0.586) (0.577) (0.536) (0.473) 
GDP-Per-Capita  0.122 0.128* 0.099 0.119* 0.128** 
  (0.077) (0.075) (0.072) (0.067) (0.053) 
Average-Education  -1.826 -3.368 -1.915 -3.310 -3.716 
  (4.101) (4.052) (3.602) (3.353) (2.741) 
Public-Share   0.169*  0.249*** 0.172*** 
   (0.096)  (0.075) (0.059) 
Foreign-Share   0.101  -0.118 -0.172 
   (0.232)  (0.173) (0.147) 
IND2   -0.202  -0.162 0.005 
   (0.146)  (0.121) (0.102) 
lnL-mean    0.033 0.017 -0.010 
    (0.034) (0.032) (0.029) 
lnL-SD    0.042 0.034 0.009 
    (0.065) (0.062) (0.050) 
lnK/L-mean    -0.090* -0.121*** -0.112*** 
    (0.050) (0.045) (0.036) 
lnK/L-SD    0.585*** 0.586*** 0.307*** 
    (0.067) (0.067) (0.055) 
lnWage-ind-SD      0.765*** 
      (0.080) 
Constant 1.942 0.672 1.670 -0.762 0.399 1.345 
 (1.479) (1.533) (1.656) (1.471) (1.593) (1.466) 
City-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
R2 0.502 0.504 0.512 0.652 0.667 0.771 
Hausman-P 0.017 0.020 0.016 0.009 0.005 0.001 
Wid-Statistics 7.184 6.163 6.631 5.887 6.469 6.401 
p-value-1  0.280 0.203 0.354 0.158 0.031 
p-value-2   0.183  0.000 0.005 
p-value-3    0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value-4      0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within-city standard deviation of log wage across manufacturing firms. 
Standard errors clustered by city are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hausman-P is the p value 
of Hausman’s endogeneity test statistics. Wid-Statistics is the F-statistics of IV in the first-stage regression. The 
last four rows report the joint significance of GDP per capita and city education, industrial and ownership structure 
variables, firm’s characteristics variables, and inter-sector wage disparities respectively. Specifically, p-value-1 is 
the p value of joint significance of GDP-Per-Capita and Average-Education, p-value-2 is the p value of joint 
significance of Public-Share, Foreign-Share and IND2, p-value-3 is the p value of joint significance of lnL-mean, 
lnL-SD, lnK/L-mean and lnK/L-SD, and p-value-4 is the p value of significance of lnWage-ind-SD.  
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Table 12: Estimation for Within-Sector Wage Dispersion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full Sample, Short-Run 0.354*** 0.391*** 0.338** 0.449*** 0.383*** 0.351*** 
 (0.112) (0.126) (0.133) (0.127) (0.131) (0.122) 
Full Sample, Long-Run -0.304*** -0.342*** -0.283*** -0.420*** -0.340*** -0.308*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Coastal, Short-Run -0.179 -0.244 -0.480** -0.110 -0.356* -0.304* 
 (0.111) (0.157) (0.232) (0.130) (0.184) (0.169) 
Coastal, Long-Run 0.239*** 0.297*** 0.553*** 0.153*** 0.396*** 0.345*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Inland, Short-Run 0.969*** 1.072*** 1.044*** 1.061*** 1.030*** 0.930*** 
 (0.188) (0.215) (0.216) (0.218) (0.218) (0.206) 
Inland, Long-Run -0.917*** -1.012*** -0.985*** -1.028*** -0.983*** -0.884*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Sector-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and their standard errors for the city size variable. The dependent variable is 
the within-sector standard deviation of log wage across firms in each city. Standard errors clustered by city are in 
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Model (1) includes only city size, model (2) adds GDP per capita 
and education, model (3) further adds industrial and ownership composition, model (4) includes city size, GDP per 
capita, education and firm characteristics, model (5) includes all the control variables, and model (6) further 
includes inter-sector wage dispersion. 
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Table 13: Effects of Agglomeration on Wage Distribution  
 90/10               50/10               90/50              
 SR LR SR LR SR LR 
China 1.105*** -1.076*** 0.841*** -0.847*** 0.264* -0.229*** 
 (0.373) (0.015) (0.279) (0.012) (0.145) (0.007) 
Coastal -0.252 0.283*** -0.186 0.200*** -0.066 0.083*** 
 (0.358) (0.030) (0.282) (0.017) (0.156) (0.016) 
Inland 1.615*** -1.591*** 1.264*** -1.273*** 0.351* -0.318*** 
 (0.567) (0.020) (0.429) (0.016) (0.212) (0.009) 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and their standard errors (clustered by city) for the city size variable. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the firm-wage 90 percentile to the firm-wage 10 percentile 
ratio, the 50/10 wage ratio, and 90/50 wage ratio respectively. The independent variables include city size, GDP 
per capita, average education, industrial and ownership structure, firm’s characteristics and inter-sector wage 
disparities.  
